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The Separation of Law and Justice: Managing 
Impressions of Corporate Ethics Programs 
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Thbs article is based on the study of  two companies that differ in their definition of 
ethics, one with a narrower definition than the other. The one with the narrower 
definition invited skepticism about its commitment to the spirit of  ethics but was better 
able to manage expectations about its ethics program. The one with the broader 
definition might have appeared more true to the spirit of  ethics but was more vulnerable 
to claims made against their own standards and language. The implications of  these 
findings for corporate ethics programs are discussed. 
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INTRODUCTION 
When people heard that defense contractors were going to implement cor- 
porate ethics programs as part of an agreement with the government, they tended 
to react with sarcasm and snickers. The press ran satirical cartoons and columns. 
There was speculation, inside and outside of the industry, as to whether the pro- 
grams would be mere image management  or more substantive attempts to address 
ethical issues. Because of the industry's high visibility and recent history of wrong- 
doing, these ethics programs were particularly vulnerable to the pejorative label, 
"law without justice," that is, they stood to be criticized for following the letter 
of the law but not living up to the spirit of ethics. This article discusses how top 
managers at two companies coped with this perceived separation of law and jus- 
tice and tried to define "ethics" in a manner  that allowed them to argue that 
their programs did, in fact, live up to the spirit of ethics and exemplify "law with 
justice." 
We discuss two companies that differ in their initial definition of ethics. Top 
managers at the first company used a narrower definition of ethics, focusing on 
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compliance with rules, while top managers at the second company offered a broader 
definition of ethics, focusing on overarching corporate values like fairness and re- 
spect. Those using a narrower definition have to justify that definition and its ex- 
clusion of issues that may seem germane to ethics. Top managers who adopted a 
broader definition of ethics may not face this challenge and may be less vulnerable 
to the charge, "law without justice." At the same time, a broad definition may gen- 
erate high expectations that the corporation lives up to its espoused values. Em- 
ployees can coopt the moralistic language of ethics to frame their claims and 
grievances (such as, "My performance evaluation was not conducted fairly, and this 
is unethical; I thought your ethics policy was to treat all employees fairly, with 
respect and dignity"). Other studies suggest that managers are less likely to respond 
to the injustice claims of less powerful constituencies (Reis, 1981). However, we 
found that top managers often tried to address employee claims, even in areas such 
as human resources, which were not originally envisioned as part of the ethics pro- 
grams and were not covered by any laws related to the ethics programs. Thus, we 
introduce the idea that employees may have realized some measure of "justice with- 
out l aw"- -another  variation on the separation of law and j u s t i c e -  as an unin- 
tended consequence of the implementation of ethics programs. 
This article will present our findings on how the company that initially defined 
its ethics program more narrowly coped with the charge, "law without justice," and 
how the company that initially defined the ethics program more broadly coped with 
increased expectations and the possibility of "justice without law." "Ethics" can be 
defined in many ways (e.g., Cavanagh, Moberg, & Velasquez, 1981), whether for 
strategic, personal or other reasons. This article traces the implications of an initial 
definition and pressures for ongoing changes to the definition. 
Our approach follows other research that has treated justice as an interpre- 
tation of an action, practice, or program (e.g., Bies, 1987; Greenberg, 1990) and 
an impression to be managed (e.g., Schlenker, 1980; Tedeshi & Reis, 1981). Greenberg 
(1990) examined the discrepancy between "looking fair" and "being fair." This re- 
search suggests that managers are motivated to "look fair" by strong norms and by 
the need to gain legitimacy or repair a damaged public image. Underlying this re- 
search, sometimes only implicitly, is the idea that "being fair" is more costly and 
may require various changes. In the case of the ethics programs, such changes might 
range from a review of defense contracting procedures (to bring them in line with 
the specifics of the law) to the creation of more opportunities for participation for 
employees (perhaps to live up to the spirit of ethics, where ethics is broadly de- 
fined). The shadow of more fundamental changes in how power and resources are 
distributed in organizations, potentially threatening to the status quo, is often cast 
when the issues of justice and ethics are raised. 
March (1987) suggests that, at first glance, tensions like the one between 
"looking fair" and "being fair" can be solved as a simple optimization problem: 
corporations should want to do the minimum required to "look fair." Once they 
determine that level, the problem is resolved. However, he adds that the problem 
is often not so simple, since corporations and their constituencies may change their 
preferences for the optimal mix. We elaborate how top managers and employees 
negotiate the definition of being fair and ethical, changing and questioning one 
Separation of Law and Justice 279 
another's definitions and their own preferences. Top managers may try to bring 
their definition of what is fair and ethical into line with what they are doing to be 
fair and ethical, in order to both "look fair" and "be fair," or "look ethical" and 
"be ethical." 
As we will show, this consistency is somewhat easier to maintain when a 
narrower definition of ethics is espoused. When employees or any other constitu- 
ency perceive a discrepancy between how the corporation is trying to appear and 
what the corporation is doing, they often seize the opportunity to demand that 
actions be brought into line with espoused values. Ironically, these challenges 
may be more likely to happen when the definition of ethics is broader and per- 
haps more substantive changes are being made anyway. Any perceived discrep- 
ancies leave managers vulnerable to the damaging charge of hypocrisy. People 
highly value consistency in their leaders (Cohen & March, 1974), and seem to 
like to expose a hypocrisy. Since programs such as corporate ethics programs are 
carefully scrutinized by various internal constituencies (Reis, 1981; Schlenker, 
1980: Tetlock & Manstead, 1985), and since "ethics" is a powerful word whose 
contested meaning invites ongoing renegotiation, there may be no stable, optimal 
solution that allows top managers to "look fair" and not face further challenges. 
Rather, there is a continual cycle, in which managers justify their actions, receive 
and anticipate reactions to both their justifications and their actions, and revise 
either their actions, their justifications, or both (Bies, 1987; Meyerson & Scully, 
1988, 19903). 
The "justice without law" possibility arises because employees can coopt the 
moralistic language of "ethics" that top managers espouse in creating ethics pro- 
grams and demand that top managers live up to that language. Employees might 
adopt the moralistic language of the ethics program to express their sense of in- 
justice and to bring a new legitimacy or urgency to their grievances and claims. 
Employees' claims are often about the fairness of human resource policies, which 
were not originally envisioned by top management to fall under the rubric of ethics. 
Top managers were motivated to respond to employee claims to avoid the appear- 
ance of hypocrisy, particularly when employees' challenges were visible (Reis, 1981; 
Tetlock & Manstead, 1985) or when they threatened the legitimacy of the programs 
(Greenberg & Cohen, 1982). 
The civil rights movement gained a lot of its power following a similar dy- 
namic. Civil rights leaders demanded that the U.S. government and U.S. citizens 
live up to the promise of equality espoused in the Constitution. If the Constitution 
had not made such a guarantee, the movement would have had a very different 
challenge to try to argue that equality was an important value. Similarly, at com- 
panies where ethics was more narrowly defined from the start, the hypocrisy charge 
could not be used by employees to push claims through the ethics programs. In- 
stead, employees would have had to argue that the top-down definition of ethics 
ought to be broader. 
3A full elaboration of the stages in this process of renegotiating the meaning of ethics and the 
implications of this process, which this article draws upon, can be found in Meyerson and Scully (1990). 
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METHOD 
Background to the Study 
In 1986, in the wake of several well-publicized indictments, forty defense con- 
tractors signed the Defense Industry Initiative (DII), an agreement with the Depart- 
ment of Defense (DOD) to create corporate ethics programs that would "reduce 
fraud, waste, and abuse." The DOD had originally proposed setting up its own hotline 
for employees to report directly any suspicions of wrongdoing. However, the corpo- 
rations preferred to create and manage their own ethics programs and to have em- 
ployees report any problems internally, with the condition that the corporations would 
voluntarily disclose to the DOD any cases of fraud that they uncovered. 
The DII stipulated that each corporation would designate a "corporate ethics 
officer," write and distribute a code of corporate ethics, establish ethics hotlines, 
and oversee the training of employees on aspects of procurement laws and other 
laws relevant to their jobs. The DII specified that there would be an annual audit 
of all participating companies for the first three years of the program to insure 
compliance. 
The DII gave more guidelines about the form of the programs than about 
their substance. The audit simply checked whether or not corporations implemented 
the specified aspects of an ethics program, for which they scored a "yes" or a "no." 
The details and criteria of implementation were vague. The statement of the pur- 
poses of the DII and the audit criteria are given in Appendix A. 
Although for the discussion in this article the DII is the immediate "law," it 
is not strictly a "law." However, it is a binding and enforceable rule of action, to 
which the governed consent. In turn the DII makes reference to a large body of 
law covering government procurement from defense contractors, such as the Fed- 
eral Acquisition Act. These laws cover pricing, specifications, conflicts of interest, 
etc. The DII is meant to ensure compliance with these laws, particularly since some 
defense contractors had been indicted for violating them. 
Sample 
Our interview sample included 18 senior executives, 6 division executives, and 
4 middle managers at two of the larger companies participating in the DII. 4 At 
each company, we interviewed the corporate ethics officer as well as a combination 
of the CEO, president, and senior or executive vice presidents of human resources, 
finance, legal, public relations, operations, and manufacturing. We encountered re- 
sistance to our proposal to interview lower-level employees, as well as the logistical 
difficulty that hourly employees' time with us would have to be charged to some 
contract or to overhead in six minute units. The mischarging of labor to the wrong 
contracts was one of the major problems that prompted the DII, so there was great 
sensitivity to this issue. 
4Our full sample, reported in Meyerson and Scully (1990), included 56 senior executives at five 
companies. Here we focus on two companies for illustration. 
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Our sample best represents top management in each company. Since top man- 
agers are the ones responsible for defining the initial scope of the ethics program 
and for responding to any challenges to that definition or to subsequent policies, the 
information from this sample is appropriate to the focus of this article. 
We conducted the interviews in 1987, when companies had just implemented 
the programs and the definitions of ethics were still being negotiated. We asked 
top managers about the evolution of the program, what the program was intended 
to accomplish and whether that involved any changes, whether they had encoun- 
tered any expected or unexpected challenges, how they had responded to these 
challenges, and whether they thought the attention to ethics would persist. 
Analysis of Interviews 
As part of a largely inductive process, our analysis was ongoing as the inter- 
views proceeded (e.g., Glaser & Strauss, 1967; Miles & Huberman, 1984). We 
analyzed each interview transcript, and supplemental corporate memos and an- 
nouncements, for (1) how top managers justified their initial definition of "ethics" 
and introduced the ethics program to internal and external constituencies; (2) how 
they perceived employees' and others' responses to their definition and their pro- 
gram, (3) how they answered these actual, anticipated, or imagined responses, 
(4) how they coped with any alleged inconsistencies among their justifications or 
between their justifications and their actions; and (5) what they anticipated future 
challenges would include. We coded the transcripts for types of responses to these 
issues, but decided that statistical significance tests would be inappropriate since 
the interviews were often open-ended and exploratory. Our aim was to uncover 
patterns and processes that would help to develop, rather than confirm, theory 
(Eisenhardt, 1989; Glaser & Strauss, 1967). 
FINDINGS 
Initial Approaches to Ethics 
Alpha Corporat ion and Gamma Corporation took different initial ap- 
proaches to ethics. Alpha Corporation created a more rules-based program, de- 
fining ethics more narrowly as compliance with rules. Gamma created a more 
values-based program, defining ethics more broadly as compliance with a general 
set of values. 
Alpha Corporation defined ethics in terms of compliance with rules, including 
both the rules in the DII about components of the ethics program and the rules 
governing contracting with the DOD. For example, they forbade employees to buy 
a visiting admiral even a cup of coffee, taking the strictest interpretation of the 
DOD rules prohibiting gifts that might influence a potential customer. They called 
their corporate ethics officer the "Director of Business Practices." He was the vocal 
spokesperson for the program within the company, almost a lightning rod, who 
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kept ethics issues strictly in his domain and away from the rest of the corporation. 
He personally handled all the calls to the ethics hotline, and directed calls about 
human resource and other issues to the "appropriate" departments. In interviews 
in the employee newsletter, he explained which kinds of calls were and were not 
appropriate to the ethics hotline, thereby carefully delimiting the domain of the 
ethics program and sending a clear message to employees that ethics was about 
compliance with the law. 
In contrast, Gamma Corporation defined ethics in terms of broad values that 
would guide managers and subordinates as they exercised discretion. Top managers 
explained that there was "no rulebook large enough" to cover all the contingencies 
that can arise in defense contracting, so they hoped that a set of values would provide 
general guidance. The values they espoused as part of ethics were often about fair- 
ness, and the corporate code of ethics included "treating customers, suppliers, and 
employees with respect and dignity." They called their corporate ethics officer "Di- 
rector of Corporate Ethics," the only company we studied to retain the powerfully 
charged word "ethics" in the formal title. He chose to be less visible within the 
corporation, letting the Chief Executive Officer be the spokesperson for ethics, to 
symbolize its importance throughout the corporation. He responded to calls about 
human resource issues and created forty additional hotlines to handle these issues. 
Top managers at Gamma made an effort to demonstrate that they were committed 
to the spirit as well as the letter of ethics and that the ethics program was consistent 
with the corporation's concern for justice and openness to needed changes. 
Challenges to the Programs 
These different definitions posed different challenges to the corporations. 
Alpha had to demonstrate that its program was not a case of "law without justice." 
Gamma had to set limits to how much "justice without law" employees could de- 
mand through the ethics program. Both corporations had to meet these challenges 
in a way that maintained the legitimacy of their ethics program and did not look 
like obvious attempts to manage meaning or to rescind earlier justifications. 
Alpha Corporation: 
Law with Justice or Law without Justice? 
Alpha Corporation faced the challenge of demonstrating that its program was 
not a case of the letter of the law without its spirit. The top managers emphasized 
repeatedly that their company had "a long tradition of integrity to counter actual 
or expected objections that their program ignored real ethical issues. They empha- 
sized that the current ethics program was something that was being imposed on 
them externally to placate Congress and the public during a time of negative publicity 
(even "a witchhunt") against the defense industry. In fact, they argued, they did 
not need such a program in order to "become" ethical, since they had been ethical 
all along. Their mere compliance with the DII did not suggest a lack of commitment 
to ethics, they claimed, but a confidence that they were already dealing with ethics. 
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It was somewhat easier for them to take this posture, since they had been indicted 
less than Gamma Corporation. 
Moreover, top managers at Alpha argued that the solution to the problems 
that had brought defense industry ethics under s c r u t i n y -  like $700 hammers - - d i d  
not lie with the corporations but with the DOD. Several managers took pains to 
explain to us why the well-publicized hammers cost $700: because the DOD made 
exacting specifications and then ordered only one at a time. Most managers also 
had their favorite example of the DOD's most ridiculous rule, such as not buying 
an admiral a 25 cent cup of coffee, lest it appear they are violating rules about 
bribing customers, or such as making sure hourly employees do not make any of 
the 27 possible mistakes in filling out a labor time card. Top managers at Alpha 
saw the ethics programs as an exercise in complying with such picayune rules, and 
therefore their compliance sometimes sounded grudging. To them, the spirit of ethics 
would be best fulfilled by an examination of the rules themselves, and if their fol- 
lowing of the law fell short of justice, it was only for this reason. 
Top managers' justifications focused on how Alpha was already sufficiently ethi- 
cal and how improvements in ethics would come from changes made by other parties, 
like the DOD. Alpha Corporation did not design its ethics program to be a vehicle 
through which it would reevaluate its own procedures, either within the domain of 
defense contracting or in other areas like human resources. Skeptics might not be 
convinced of their arguments that they were sufficiently ethical, in the broadest sense. 
Because ethics is such a heated word, it remains difficult to maintain a narrow defi- 
nition for the ethics program. Maintaining a narrow definition might appear to some 
critics to be defensive rhetoric or an effort to avoid potentially costly and threatening 
changes that a broader definition of ethics might occasion. 
It is not the purpose of this article to treat Alpha and Gamma definitively as 
cases of "law with justice" or "law without justice." The discussion above points out 
that there are numerous and malleable definitions of ethics and that top managers 
are sensitive to numerous potential impressions of their programs when they define 
ethics. The evaluation of ethics programs is complicated by the lack of clear criteria 
for success of the programs. For example, success might be measured by many calls 
to the ethics hotline (e.g., indicating that the hotline is visible and trusted by employ- 
ees) or by few calls to the ethics hotline (e.g., indicating there are no problems to 
be reported); success might be unobservable, such as indictments that do not happen. 
Therefore, the evaluation of these ethics programs cannot be reduced to objective 
criteria and continues to rely on fairly subjective definitions and preferences. 
Gamma Corporation: 
The Possibility of Justice without Law 
By defining ethics more broadly, Gamma was somewhat less vulnerable to 
the label, "law without justice." At the same time, its constituencies were vigilant 
that the corporation live up to its own high standards. A broad definition of ethics 
created high expectations. Through the implementation of ethics programs, em- 
ployees found a way to argue normatively for organizational changes that were not 
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explicitly part of any law related to ethics programs or defense contracting. These 
changes might have been perceived by employees as making the corporation more 
ethical and more just or might have been favored by employees previously and 
then opportunistically labeled a matter of ethics. 
The ethics hotlines at both Alpha and Gamma were swamped with calls per- 
taining to human resource issues. Only about ten percent of the calls were inquiries 
about the correct procedures for avoiding fraud, waste, and abuse, or allegations 
that required investigation. Employees who chose to use the ethics hotline for these 
claims and to put their claims in terms of ethics took the perspective that human 
resource issues were ethical matters and had to be remedied to fulfill the spirit of 
ethics. They raised a variety of issues, from unfair treatment by a supervisor to 
questions about whether a layoff was fair. Some issues required only a minor fix, 
but others posed major challenges. 
One caller to Gamma's ethics hotline claimed that it was both unfair and 
wasteful that lower-level employees who went on business trips had to surrender 
their frequent flier points in the name of keeping down costs to the government 
and the taxpayer, while top executives nonetheless were allowed to fly first class. 
The caller invoked the idea of "reducing waste," which was very much in the lan- 
guage of the DII. Moreover, the caller spoke of an unfair "double standard" for 
the two levels in the company, and invoked Gamma's own definition of "treating 
all employees fairly and with respect." 
The problem did not pose any real challenge to how rewards and perquisites 
were distributed more generally in the corporation, because it admitted a rela- 
tively easy administrative solution. Top managers at Gamma decided that every- 
one could keep their frequent flier points, while no one could fly first class. Two 
top managers pointed to this case as an example of corporate responsiveness to 
employee claims and also an example of how, in the net, costs would be cut and 
waste reduced. 
Other employee challenges did not permit such straightforward solutions. For 
example, employees in one division of Gamma went on strike over a wage cut that 
they felt was unfair. The CEO responded that they had five days to return to work, 
or they would lose their jobs. The union president urged employees to stay out on 
strike, and the corporation went ahead and hired others for their jobs. The union 
president wrote an angry letter to the CEO, essentially charging him with hypocrisy 
- - h o w  could the CEO claim that he and the company were committed to ethics 
and so dramatically violate its spirit? The CEO justified his action to us, saying 
that the union president had himself been unethical in encouraging employees to 
continue striking when there was a clear threat that they would lose their jobs. The 
CEO felt that he himself had been ethical in giving them a deadline and sticking 
to it. He also argued, ironically, that ethics could not be what anyone conveniently 
wanted to call it to bolster their position. He felt that the union president was 
being manipulative in his use of the word "ethics," and that this word had "planted 
dynamite" in the corporation. 
We later interviewed the person who handled calls to the ethics hotline 
at the Gamma division where the strike and layoff occurred. He had received 
many calls from people upset that their friends had lost their jobs. He neither 
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criticized nor defended the corporate policy, but he did try to console the call- 
ers. In this case, the ethics hotline may have served not so much as a channel 
for venting perceived injustices as a means of "cooling out the mark" (Goffman, 
1952). 
In contrast, at Alpha Corporation, which had endorsed a narrow definition, 
the employees had weaker grounds for arguing that their human resource issues 
were ethical matters that deserved attention. Consistent with the initial definition, 
top managers argued that these were not issues for the ethics programs. The Di- 
rector of Business Practices, who answered the hotline, redirected people to the 
personnel department or back to their own supervisors. It is one thing for employees 
to make claims against a program by using the program's own language. It is quite 
another thing for employees to try to redefine the program's language and to argue 
that it should be broader than what top management espouses. 
The narrower definition of ethics at Alpha made it easier to deflect human 
resources issues away from the ethics program. However, top management could 
not assume that this response would easily placate employees, simply because it 
was consistent. Therefore, even at Alpha, top managers expressed concern over 
how to handle these calls and over how well employees accepted management's 
justifications about the scope of the ethics programs. 
Top managers at both corporations could not afford to have employees be- 
come cynical about or disinterested in  the ethics program. For pragmatic reasons, 
they wanted the ethics hotline to be used by employees and to remain an effective 
net for catching problems internally, lest a disgruntled employee go outside the 
company with an issue and cause an unwanted public expos& 
DISCUSSION 
Alpha's use of a narrower definition of ethics invited skepticism about their 
commitment to the spirit of ethics, but enabled them to manage expectations of 
the program. Gamma's use of a broader definition of ethics might have appeared 
truer to the spirit of ethics, but left them vulnerable to a wide range of claims 
made against their own standards and in their own language. Alpha experienced 
pressure to broaden its definition to cope with criticism. Gamma felt pressure to 
live up to its broad definition or reconsider its definition and delimit what claims 
might be raised in the name of ethics. 
To the extent that employees at Gamma have gained a new opportunity and 
a new channel for raising grievances, and perhaps even more to the extent that 
their grievances are actually addressed, they have gained a measure of justice 
through the ethics programs. This justice is "justice without law" inasmuch as these 
gains are not based on laws specifically about human resource issues, but based on 
the normative language of ethics. 
Employees' quickness to respond to any suggestion of hypocrisy and top man- 
agers' desire to avoid the charge of hypocrisy gave impetus to these gains. This 
dynamic of trying to live up to one's own managed impression is particularly prob- 
lematic in the case of ethics programs, where the desired impression is ambiguous 
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and is forged in the lofty language of ethics. A similar dynamic may operate in 
other situations as well. For example, numerous corporations and politicians are 
now espousing enthusiastic commitment to environmental issues, while skeptical 
activists are pushing them to make their actions and their votes live up to their 
statements. 
This general process is similar to the dynamic through which employees' 
moral outrage about a variety of perceived injustices is managed, as Bies (1987) 
describes. Bies claims that managers are pressured to respond to employees' moral 
outrage, yet he does not elaborate the mechanism through which this pressure 
develops. Our study suggests that the need to avoid appearing hypocritical not 
only helps managers save face, but also protects the credibility of the program 
being justified. 
Hypocrisy is often regarded as a vice (Shklar, 1984). Indeed, some might argue 
that, though employees have weaker grounds for appeal at Alpha, at least Alpha 
is being consistent and living up to its own definition, even if it is a narrower defi- 
nition. In line with the suggestions of others (March 1976, 1979; Weick, 1979), we 
have illustrated in earlier work (Meyerson & Scully, 1987) why we might instead 
be more tolerant of hypocrites, since those who talk more morally than they act 
may be precisely those who are preparing to act more morally. This study suggests 
that, without such moralistic talk, employees and critics have weaker grounds for 
demanding more moral action. Thus, there may be reason for researchers to herald 
hypocrites, but at the same time, lenience on the part of participants who perceive 
the hypocrisy might mean a loss of the impetus for change described in this article. 
Praise might be reserved for former hypocrites. 
There is reason to be hopeful about hypocrisy insofar as sometimes the ten- 
sion between the language of ethics and the actual ethics policies is resolved by 
bringing the policies into line with the language, as in the case of "justice without 
law." However, the tension can be resolved in the other direction, by tempering 
the language and not changing the policies. For example, Gamma Corporation may 
decide to narrow its definition of ethics or redefine the scope of what is appropriate 
to the ethics program. This possibility was suggested in the response of the CEO 
of Gamma to the strike and layoff, where he argued that everything cannot con- 
veniently be raised as a matter of ethics. Nonetheless, there may be limits to what 
those with the power to manage meaning in organizations can do once certain defi- 
nitions, even of their own creation, gain credence. 
When the ethics programs become institutionalized, their moralistic language 
might lose its currency. Will this mean that the gains made by appealing to this 
language-- the  "justice without law"--wil l  not persist? Employees have gained 
some voice and made some small substantive gains through the ethics programs, 
particularly at Gamma Corporation. It remains to be seen whether the gains can 
outlast the three-year mandate of the DII. If employees' gains are not backed by 
law, they may be tenuous. 
Most advances in employee rights have been backed by laws, such as affirm- 
ative action, occupational safety, and the right to vote for a union. However, it is 
sometimes argued that these laws lose their spirit once they are institutionalized 
in corporations; they can become a set of administrative rules to follow. The 
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manipulation of numbers to meet  affirmative action targets is sometimes cited in 
this regard, and some top managers we interviewed even drew analogies between 
the future of the ethics program and the current weakened state of many affirm- 
ative action programs, The possibility of "law without justice" points out that the 
law itself may not be sufficient to bring about justice. 
"Ethics" is a powerful word that may not lose its impact. If it continues to 
be used in corporations it may continue to invite attention to value-laden issues. 
Without being too sanguine, we can ask whether the gains made by using the nor- 
mative language of ethics will persist as long as the normative language holds sway. 
This study raises the interesting question of whether changes brought about  nor- 
matively in corporations can be as effective as, or even more effective than, changes 
brought about coercively through law. 
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A P P E N D I X  A: 
THE DEFENSE INDUSTRY INITIATIVE (DII) 5 
2. All companies that signed the DII "pledged . . . to promote ethical business 
conduct through the implementation of policies, procedures and programs in the 
following six areas:" 
1. Written codes of ethics. 
2. Ethics training. 
3. Internal reporting of alleged misconduct. 
4. Se l f -governance  through the implementa t ion  of  systems to mon i to r  
compliance with federal procurement  laws and the adoption of procedures 
for voluntary disclosure of violations to the appropriate authorities. 
5. Responsibility to the industry. 
6. Accountability to the public. 
II. Auditors reviewed the companies using an 18-point questionnaire; companies 
scored a "yes" or "no"  for each question. 
1. Does the company have a written code of business ethics and conduct? 
2. Is the code distributed to all employees principally involved in defense 
work? 
3. Are new employees provided any orientation to the code? 
5Taken from The Ethics Resource Center's 1987 Annual Report to the Public and the Defense Industry 
on the Defense Industry Initiatives on Business Ethics and Conduct, Washington, D.C., January 1988. 
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4. Does the code assign responsibility to operating management and others 
for compliance with the code? 
5. Does the company conduct employee training programs regarding the 
code? 
6. Does the code address standards that govern the conduct of employees 
in their dealings with suppliers, consultants, and customers? 
7. Is there a corporate review board, ombudsman, corporate compliance or 
ethics office or similar mechanism for employees to report suspected 
violations to someone other than their direct supervisor, if necessary? 
8. Does the mechanism employed protect the confidentiality of employee 
reports? 
9. Is there an appropriate mechanism to follow up on reports of suspected 
violations to determine what occurred and who was responsible, and to 
recommend corrective and other actions? 
10. Is there an appropriate mechanism for letting employees know the result 
of any follow up into their reported charges? 
11. Is there an ongoing program of communication to employees, spelling 
out and reemphasizing their obligations under the code of conduct? 
12. What are the specifics of such a program: Written communication? One- 
on-one communication? Group meetings? Visual aids? communication? 
Others? 
13. Does the company have a procedure for voluntarily reporting violations 
of federal procurement laws to appropriate governmental agencies? 
14. Is implementation of the code's provisions one of the standards by which 
all levels of supervision are expected to be measured in their performance? 
15. Is there a program to monitor on a continuing basis adherence to the 
code of conduct and compliance with federal procurement laws? 
16. Does the company participate in the industry's "Best Practices Forum?" 
17. Are periodic reports on adherence to the principles made to the company's 
Board of Directors or to its audit or other appropriate committee? 
18. Are the company's independent public accountants or a similar independent 
organization required to comment to the Board of Directors or a committee 
thereof on the efficacy of the company's internal procedures for implementing 
the company's code of conduct? 
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